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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 • Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that the contract was 
ambiguous as to the right of a prevailing third-party beneficiary, named in the contract but 
not a signatory to the contract, to an award of attorney's fees in the face of contractual 
language which states: "In any action arising out of this contract, the prevailing party shall 
be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." (Preserved at R. at 4-5,235-36, and 416-
25.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Interwest Construction v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350 
(Utah 1996) ("Determining whether a contract is ambiguous presents a threshold question 
of law, which we review for correctness.") 
2. If the contract is found to be ambiguous as a matter of law, whether the trial 
court correctly and appropriately interpreted the attorney's fee provision of the contract in 
denying the Plaintiffs claim for attorneys fees. (Preserved at R. at 4-5,235-36, and 416-25.) 
Standard of Review: Clearly erroneous. Edwards & Daniels Architects. Inc. v. 
Farmers1 Properties. Inc.. 865 P.2d 1382 (Utah App. 1993); Rule 52(a) of the UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
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there never was a listing arrangement between the Wardley and Welsh because Welsh 
refused to enter into any such listing with Wardley, and, since there was no listing, there was 
no net listing. (The Court's oral ruling is included as Attachment 3 and the Court's written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are included as Attachment 4.) (R. at 465 and 764-
68.) Accordingly, judgment in the amount of $15,173.75, plus interest thereon, was entered 
in Wardley's favor for the full amount of the commissions. (R. at 467-68.) (The Judgment 
is included as Attachment 5.) At the conclusion of trial, the Court asked the parties to submit 
additional memoranda on the issue of attorney's fees and costs. After reviewing those 
memoranda, the trial court held that the Contract was ambiguous as to whether Wardley was 
entitled to its attorney's fees, and since extrinsic evidence did not clarify the intent of the 
parties, denied Wardley's attorney's fees. (R. at 477-78.) (The Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law are included as Attachment 6.) The trial court did award 
Wardley its costs, including the cost of the additional depositions requested by Welsh at the 
first summary judgment hearing. (R. at 477-78.) (The Order on Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
is included as Attachment 7.) 
Welsh has appealed from the judgment awarding Wardley's commissions. (R. at 471-
72.) Wardley has appealed the trial court's decision denying its attorney's fees under the 
Contract. (R. at 495-96; 502-04.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to May 31, 1994, Welsh owned an interest in certain real property situated at 
approximately 4800 West and 8600 South in Salt Lake County, Utah, and commonly referred 
to as Dorilee Acres (the "Subject Property"). (R. at 1.) Wardley is a real estate brokerage 
and Randy Young ("Young") is a real estate agent licensed through Wardley. (R. at 2,94.) 
Prior to May 31, 1994, Young and Welsh, who is a broker himself and who was interested 
in selling the Subject Property, discussed Young's possibly finding a buyer for the Subject 
Property and earning a commission pursuant thereto. (R. at 463, 635.) Welsh repeatedly 
refused to grant Young and Wardley a listing on the Subject Property. (R. at 618.) Randy 
Young then introduced Welsh to Leon Peterson ("Peterson") as a potential buyer for the 
Subject Property and informed Welsh of Peterson's interest in the property. (R. at 98, 463.) 
Pursuant to negotiations directly between Welsh and Peterson, Welsh and Peterson on or 
about May 31,1994, entered into the Contract, which was written by Welsh, for Welsh's sale 
of the Subject Property. (R. at 99, 647.) At the time of the execution of the Contract, Welsh 
and Peterson also entered into an "Addendum No. 1," which Welsh also wrote in his own 
handwriting, which provides, "While Wardley BH&G has no agency relationship with 
neither the Seller nor the Buyer, the Seller agrees to pay $500.00 per acre to Wardley BH&G, 
at settlement." (R. at 277.) 
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On or about July 19, 1994, Welsh conveyed to Peterson, as a partial release under the 
contract, approximately 21 acres of the property, and Welsh paid Wardley the full 
commission of $10,556.80 for that portion of the property. (R. at 95.) Disputes 
subsequently arose between Welsh and Peterson, and they eventually entered into a 
Settlement Agreement, dated April 10, 1995, which specifically incorporated into the 
Settlement Agreement the terms of the Contract, which included the provisions of Addendum 
No. 1. (R.at95.) 
On or about April 24,1995, Welsh conveyed to Peterson an additional 16.70 acres of 
the property but, unlike the payment at the time of the first release, refused to pay Wardleyfs 
commission of $8,350.70. (R. at 95.) Again, on May 26,1995, Welsh conveyed to Peterson 
another 13.6475 acres of property, and Welsh again refused to pay Wardley's $6,823.80 
commission. (R. at 96.) Wardley brought this action to enforce the Contract, which Welsh 
himself wrote, providing for payment of the commissions owing. (R. at 1-5.) Wardley also 
asserted a claim for its attorney's fees and costs incurred in bringing this action to enforce the 
contract, based upon the contract language stating: "In any action arising out of this contract, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fee." (R. at 4.) 
At trial, Wardley prevailed on the merits and was awarded judgment against Welsh 
for the commissions. (R. at 467-68.) The trial court, taking the issue of attorney's fees and 
costs under advisement, subsequently determined that the contract was ambiguous as to 
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whether the attorney's fee provision applied to other than the signatories to the contract. (R. 
at 477-78.) Accordingly, the Court denied Plaintiffs claim for attorney's fees, awarding only 
costs to the Plaintiff. (R. at 499-500.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
If an appellant wishes to challenge the factual findings of the trial court, on appeal the 
appellant must first marshal all of the evidence in support of those findings and demonstrate 
that, in spite of this evidence, they are clearly erroneous being against the clear weight of the 
evidence. As Welsh has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's factual 
findings, none of those findings may be disturbed in this appeal. 
Welsh has also improperly tried to present new arguments and issues in this appeal. 
Specifically, he attempts for the first time to raise argument relating to alleging fiduciary 
duties and breaches thereof which Welsh previously failed to present to the trial court when 
these issues were pending on Wardley's Motion for summary judgment. But, in seeking to 
overturn the trial court's ruling granting partial summary judgment, Welsh is limited to the 
arguments, issues, and evidence raised or presented at the trial court level. Wardley's 
response to these new arguments is made subject to this specific objection. 
Welsh claims that Wardley must have acted as buyer's agent, seller's agent, or as a 
dual agent in the transaction herein. This position, however, is not supported by Utah law, 
which does not limit the roles a real estate agent can legally assume to that extent. Further, 
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the very terms of the Contract drafted by Welsh himself entitle Wardley to a commission by 
virtue of its role as a finder and without assuming any of these agency roles asserted by 
Welsh. Welsh, who is a broker himself, created the very situation which he claims is 
precluded by law. He only now argues in favor of the existence of the agency relationship, 
which he refused to enter into, to avoid the obligation for commission. Since Welsh 
negotiated and documented the nature of this relationship with Wardley, he cannot 
legitimately argue that a different relationship existed in an obvious attempt to avoid paying 
the balance of the commission owing. 
Fiduciary relationships arise only by contract or by circumstances where one party has 
been induced to relax the care and vigilance they would otherwise exercise. In this case, 
Welsh intentionally precluded a fiduciary relationship by the very wording of the contract, 
and he failed to allege any circumstance showing that he as a real estate broker had been 
induced to relax the care and vigilance he would have otherwise exercised in this transaction. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly held that no fiduciary relationship existed. Even if a 
fiduciary relationship had existed, Welsh seeks to impose duties on Wardley which are 
beyond those imposed by Utah law. 
The trial court properly determined that the transaction herein did not constitute a net 
listing. A net listing is defined by Rule R162-1-2.11 of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
as, UA listing wherein the amount of real estate commission is the difference between the 
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selling price of the property and the minimum price set by the seller." Welsh refused to enter 
in to any listing agreement with Wardley, and subsequently reiterated in the Contract and by 
letter to Young that Wardley was not his agent, whether listing or otherwise. The trial court, 
therefore, properly held that no listing existed between Welsh and Wardley, and thus, no net 
listing existed. Even if there were a listing, the commission is set by the terms of the 
Contract at a flat fee of $500.00 per acre and in no way references either the selling price or 
the minimum amount required by the seller. 
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Welsh's Motion to Amend 
his Answer only days before trial. Welsh's Motion was served on the Wardley effectively 
one business day before trial, without any justification for the delay. All discovery had been 
completed by Welsh over a month before he brought his Motion, indicating that he was 
aware of the facts relating to the Motion long before it was filed. Further, the case had 
developed, partial summary judgment had been entered, and Wardley had prepared for trial 
based on the posture of the pleadings prior to the Motion. To allow amendment at this late 
point in the proceedings would have, therefore, resulted in unfair prejudice to Wardley. 
The Contract provides that, "In any action arising out of this contract, the prevailing 
party should be awarded its attorney's fees." Pursuant to the unambiguous language of this 
provision, Wardley is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees as it meets the only two 
requirements, namely (1) this is an action arising out of the Contract, and (2) Wardley is the 
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prevailing party in this action. The trial court, however, determined that the Contract was 
not clear on whether Wardley, as a named third-party beneficiary, could recover under this 
provision. Since the rights of a third-party beneficiary are determined by the intentions of 
the contracting parties, the trial court properly sought to determine those intentions. When 
the intent could not be determined by extrinsic evidence, the trial court then denied 
Wardley's claim. Under the rules of contract interpretation, however, when the intent of the 
parties cannot be determined by extrinsic evidence, the next step is to interpret the contract 
against the drafter. Accordingly, any ambiguity in the contract herein should have been 
construed against Welsh as the drafter, allowing Wardley to recover its attorney's fees and 
costs and requiring reversal of the trial court's ruling on this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
WELSH HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS AND, THUS, THOSE FINDINGS 
OF FACT MAY NOT BE DISTURBED. 
Following the trial in this action, the trial court entered findings of fact and later 
issued supplemental findings of fact relating to the issue of attorneys' fees. (R. at 462-66, 
477-78 and 764-69.) Among the more significant of the Court's findings, are the following: 
13. Throughout this transaction, neither Plaintiff nor Randy Young 
were agents for the Defendant, which is evidenced by the testimony of Mr. 
Welsh, the testimony of Mr. Young, the language of the Addendum itself, and 
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the letter from Defendant to Randy Young dated March 19, 1995, reaffirming 
their representation. 
14. There never was a listing arrangement between the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant because the Defendant refused to enter into any such listing 
with the Plaintiff. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. at 465.) All of the trial court's factual findings 
must remain undisturbed in this appeal since Welsh has failed to marshal the evidence in 
favor of the Court's findings prior to setting forth his arguments claiming that those findings 
are erroneous. That is a necessary initial step in challenging the trial court's factual 
determinations: 
To successfully challenge a trial court's factual findings, "[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to 
be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" 
Jacobs v. Hafen. 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994), quoting In re Estate of BarteL 776 
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Estate v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). If the 
appellant fails to marshal the evidence as required above, the appellate court assumes that 
the record supports the findings of the trial court and the trial court's findings are not 
disturbed. Jacobs at 561; Pasker. Gould, Ames & Weber v. Morris. 887 P.2d 872, 877 (Utah 
App. 1994); Alta Industries. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282,1286 (Utah 1993).) The Appellant 
has made no effort whatsoever to marshal the evidence in favor of the trial court's finding 
of fact and, accordingly, these findings must stand on appeal. Sanders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 
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198,199 (Utah 1991). Subject to this position that the Court's factual findings have not been 
properly marshaled by Welsh and, therefore, cannot be reversed by this appeal, Wardley 
responds to the arguments raised by Welsh as set forth below. 
II. 
WELSH CANNOT RAISE NEW ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
In both Welsh's written and oral arguments in opposition to Wardley's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Welsh argued that Wardley had breached fiduciary duties owing to him 
and was thus precluded from receiving a commission. Even assuming, however, for sake of 
argument that an agency relationship did exist, Welsh's claims of breach under any fiduciary 
duties owed, as set forth in his Memorandum in Opposition to the Summary Judgment, were 
limited to the supposed "misrepresenting the nature of [Young's] agency relationship 
between the parties; miscommunicating or withholding information during the course of 
delicate negotiations to resolve a dispute over the real estate purchase contract which 
ultimately led to a substantial loss of profit for the seller on a final phase of the subdivision." 
(R. at 122.) Further, in oral argument, the trial court specifically asked Welsh's counsel, 
assuming there was an agency or fiduciary relationship, "Where's the breach?" Welsh's 
counsel then provided only two bases for breach, namely, (1) an allegation (which notably 
was not properly supported by affidavit) that Young had improperly taken Peterson's side 
when disputes arose between Welsh and Peterson, resulting in an alleged breach of a 
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fiduciary duty of loyalty, and (2) an allegation that Young breached some duty of loyalty by 
attending the closing with Peterson (which was shown, later in the hearing, to be a factual 
misstatement of Peterson's deposition testimony). (R. at 547-49.) These issues and 
arguments contrast sharply with detailed and lengthy arguments presented in Welsh's brief 
relating to fiduciary duties and the breach thereof. 
In this appeal, Welsh attempts to argue additional duties owed and subsequently 
breached by reference to numerous regulations that were never cited prior to this appeal. 
This he cannot do. In challenging the trial court's entry of partial summary judgment, Welsh 
is limited to the issues, arguments and evidence presented when the summary judgment 
motion was pending in the trial court. Bangerter v. Poulton. 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983); 
Bakerv. Angus. 910 P.2d 427,431, n.3 (Utah App. 1996). Welsh had been given additional 
time to take depositions, and yet his summary judgment response was supported only by his 
own affidavit which, as the trial court stated, offered "only conclusory statements without 
any evidentiary support" relating to the breaches alleged. (R. at 556.) Accordingly, Welsh's 
failure to take full advantage of his opportunity to defend against Wardley's motion when 
pending does not allow him to now seek reversal of the trial court's ruling by rearguing that 
motion with arguments never made to the trial court in the first instance. Wardley responds 
to the arguments raised in Welsh's brief subject to this objection. In short, while Welsh 
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claims some fiduciary breach, he has never satisfied the trial court as to what the breach was 
or how he was supposedly damaged. 
III. 
THE CONTRACT, HANDWRITTEN BY WELSH, EXPRESSLY 
PROVIDED THAT WARDLEY WAS ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION 
WITHOUT BEING AN AGENT OF EITHER THE BUYER OR THE SELLER. 
The Defendant claims that Wardley must have acted as agent for either the buyer or 
the seller, or both, in the transaction herein. Yet, paragraph 12 of Addendum No. 1 to the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract, which was drafted by Welsh in his own handwriting, clearly 
provides: "While Wardley BH&G has no agency relationship with neither (sic) the seller nor 
the buyer, the seller agrees to pay $500.00 per acre to Wardley BH&G at settlement." (R. 
at 647; R. at 277.) Welsh claims that Utah law permits real estate agents to act only as a 
buyer's agent, a seller's agent, or as a dual agent representing both parties, precluding any 
other status. Welsh's position, however, is inaccurate and is not supported by case law, 
statute, rule or regulation. While the rules and regulations promulgated by the Division of 
Real Estate do contain provisions which apply specifically when a real estate agent is acting 
as a buyer's or seller's agent, these specific provisions do not preclude or prohibit a real 
estate agent from acting in any other capacity in a transaction. In fact, Rule Rl 62-6-1.9 of 
the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE specifically contemplates that a real estate agent may be 
involved in a transaction in a role other than as the buyer's agent or the seller's agent by 
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referring to a finder's fee situation: "A licensee may not pay a finder's fee or give any 
valuable consideration to an unlicenced person or entity for referring a prospect in a real 
estate transaction, except as provided in this rule." Accordingly, Utah law, while limiting 
finder's fees only to licensed agents, obviously does not preclude or limit the capacities in 
which a licensed real estate agent can legally act in a transaction to only those of buyer's 
agent, seller's agent, or dual agent. 
Further, Welsh, who is a licensed real estate broker himself and who is expected to 
be well aware of the laws and regulations relating to real estate agents, created the very 
situation which he claims is prohibited by Utah law. (R. at 647.) In fact, Randy Young was 
not even present at the time the contract referenced above was drafted and signed by Welsh 
and by the buyer, Leon Peterson, another broker. (R. at 611.) Now, in a transparent and 
ineffectual attempt to circumvent his obligation to pay the commission which he himself 
inserted into the contract, Welsh claims that Wardley violated Rule Rl 62-6-2.7 of the Utah 
Administrative Code which states: "In every real estate transaction involving a licensee, as 
agent or principal, the licensee shall fully disclose in writing to the buyer and seller . . . his 
agency relationship(s). The disclosure shall be made prior to the buyer and seller... entering 
into a binding agreement with each other." (Emphasis supplied.) Notably, this rule only 
requires such a disclosure when a real estate agent is involved as an agent or principal; Welsh 
himself evidenced that Wardley was not an agent of either party in this transaction. Even if 
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this rule were applicable in the present situation, Welsh himself satisfied the agency 
disclosure requirements when he wrote into the contract that Wardley had no agency 
relationship with either the buyer or the seller. Since this statement was part of the Contract 
negotiated and signed by both parties, each was aware of the non-agency status between 
themselves and Wardley. Rule Rl 62-6-2.7 does not specify the format of such a disclosure; 
and any "disclosure" from Wardley back to Welsh and Peterson would have been redundant 
and meaningless. 
Welsh's argument that Wardley represented at least one, and arguably both, of the 
parties herein is disingenuous since Welsh, ignoring his own specified language, is simply 
attempting to avoid an agreed obligation although he continually refused to enter into a 
listing agreement with Randy Young. (R. at 618.) Hence, Welsh himself created the 
situation wherein Wardley did not assume the fiduciary duties which Welsh now attempts to 
fabricate to avoid a commission. The Court should reject Welsh's meritless position through 
his attempt to avoid the provisions in the contract he drafted. The trial court rejected Welsh's 
"agency" argument on summary judgment, and Welsh now has no legitimate basis to 
overturn that ruling. 
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IV. 
WELSH REFUSED TO ALLOW WARDLEY TO ACT AS HIS AGENT 
Young and Wardley were precluded from being agents of either the buyer or the seller 
by the parties' refusal to agree to that relationship. In his brief, Welsh claims that Young and 
Wardley participated too actively in the transaction not to have been an agent of the parties. 
What is certain is that, by Welsh's own admission, he refused to enter into a listing 
agreement with Randy Young, wrote into the Contract with Leon Peterson that Wardley 
represented neither the buyer nor the seller, and then reiterated the fact that Young was not 
his agent and had no authority to represent him in a letter dated nearly one year after Welsh 
entered into the Contract with Leon Peterson, which stated, "I would like to remind you that 
you do not represent me in any way whatsoever, nor do you maintain any kind of agency 
relationship with me, whatsoever." (R. at 272, 618.) Thus, Welsh's own undisputed actions 
provided sufficient grounds to refute his agency arguments and the Court was well justified 
in granting partial summary judgment. 
Welsh cannot on the one hand refuse to allow Wardley and Young to act as his agent 
and at the same time claim that they owe him all of the fiduciary duties and obligations of a 
seller's agent which arise only in an agency relationship. A fiduciary relationship only arises 
as follows: 
A fiduciary or confidential relationship may be created by contract or 
by circumstances where equity will imply a higher duty in a relationship 
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because the trusting party has been induced to relax the care and 
vigilance he would ordinarily exercise. In such a case, the evidence 
must demonstrate the placement of trust and reliance such that the 
nature of the relationship is clear. 
Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmerica. Inc.. 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982). It is abundantly clear, 
and the trial court so found, that Welsh refused any listing arrangement, did not want 
Wardley as his agent, drafted the Contract that way, and consistently thereafter (until this 
lawsuit) recognized no agency relationship. In fact, Welsh even had previously paid part of 
the commissions under the Contract. (R. at 95.) The trial court properly held that the 
Contract was unambiguous and fully integrated and that by its terms indicated that no agency 
relationship existed between Wardley and Welsh. The Court further held that Welsh had 
failed to present any evidence whatsoever, other than his own affidavit of conclusory 
statements without any evidentiary support, that a fiduciary relationship was created by 
Welsh relaxing the care and vigilance he would have otherwise exercised. (R. at 552-556.) 
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court in granting partial summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
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V. 
WELSH SEEKS TO IMPOSE DUTIES ON WARDLEY AND YOUNG WHICH 
ARE BEYOND THOSE IMPOSED BY UTAH LAW. 
Welsh alleges that Wardley and Young violated provisions of Utah real estate law. 
However, as set forth below, none of the referenced sections were violated or, in fact, are 
applicable to the situation which existed in the present case. 
(a) Rule R162-6-2.7 of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE provides: 
In every real estate transaction involving a licensee, as agent or principal, the 
licensee shall fully disclose in writing to buyer and seller . . . his agency 
relationship(s). The disclosure shall be made prior to the buyer and seller . . 
. entering into a binding agreement with each other. The disclosure shall 
become a part of the permanent file. 
The inapplicability of this rule to the present case is fully argued above. This Rule was not 
violated and, indeed, does not apply. 
(b) Rule Rl 62-6-2.7.1 of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE requires, 
When a binding agreement is signed in a sales transaction, the prior 
agency disclosure shall be confirmed in a separate provision incorporated in 
or attached to that agreement, which shall be as follows: 
"AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this contract the listing 
agent represents ( )Buyer ( ) Seller, and the selling agent represents ( ) Buyer 
( ) Seller. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this contract written 
disclosure of the agency relationships(s) was provided to him/her. () (Buyer's 
initials) ( ) (Seller's initials)." 
The language required by this rule, in its very form, applies only to a situation where an agent 
represents a buyer or a seller. In this situation, Welsh insisted that Wardley represented 
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neither party, making this form inapplicable to the present case. Even if Wardley had been 
an agent of either the buyer or the seller, the real estate purchase contract was entered into 
by Welsh and Peterson in Randy Young's absence, precluding Young from inserting 
anything into that document. (R. at 99, 611.) Further, Welsh's disclosure in the Contract 
adequately defined and disclosed the relationship of the parties herein, making further form 
language meaningless. 
(c) R162-6-l.ll of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, provides: 
Failure to have a written agency agreement. To avoid 
representing more than one party without the informed consent 
of all parties, principals, broker and licensees acting on their 
behalf shall have written agency agreements with their 
principals. 
(Emphasis added.) Since Welsh precluded an agency relationship, as fully set forth above, 
he in no way was Wardley's principal. 
(d) Rule Rl 62-6-2.16(1) and (2) of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE list the duties 
of a seller's agent and a buyer's agent. This rule is also inapplicable since neither Wardley 
nor Young was an agent or, indeed, allowed to be an agent. It necessarily follows that 
neither owed Welsh duties as his agent, even assuming there was any damage to Welsh. 
(e) Rule Rl 62-6-2.16(3) of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE sets forth duties of 
a dual agent. This section, by its very terms, applies only the situation where a real estate 
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agent is representing both the buyer and the seller in the same transaction, which, once again, 
is not the situation in this case, rendering this section inapplicable. 
VI 
( 111" ( UIAIII, I OH 1(1 PROPER I A i I H J ) i i I AT ! ii I IN ¥,J i JSTING EXISTED. 
In another argument rejected by the trial court, Welsh attempts to avoid his obligations 
by asserting that Wardley's arrangement with him was a "net listing," which, somehow, 
allegedly defeats the unambiguous rights to a commission under the Contract. Inherent in 
his argument, w ithoi it adequate authority, is the assi in ipti :: 1:1 that a ' iolation of that n lie 
transcends a licensure issue and automatically precludes payment of a commission. 
Rule R162-1-2.11 of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE defines a net listing as: "A 
listing wherein the amount of real estate commission is the difference between the selling 
price of I he Subjct! Property .'ind lh<1 imimniun price Ml in (lie seller." (Emphasis added.) 
The commission which is the subject of this action does not fall within the above definition 
because Wardley did not have a listing on the property in the first place. In fact, Grant Welsh 
adamantly refused to enter into a listing agreement with Randy Young and Wardley. (R. at 
618.) 
Even if a listing agreement had been entered into by Welsh and Wardley, the 
commission was not structured as a net listing. Wardley's right to commission is based upon 
the real estate purchase contract between the buyer and seller which states, in pertinent part, 
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"[t]he Seller agrees to pay $500.00 per acre to Wardley BH&G, at settlement." (R. at 277.) 
Significantly, the Contract does not describe Wardley's commission as the difference 
between the selling price of the property and a minimum price set by the seller. Instead, 
Welsh documented the commission as a flat fee of $500.00 per acre and in no way referenced 
either the selling price or the minimum amount required by the Seller. 
In his brief, Welsh tries to argue that preliminary conversations between Randy Young 
and Grand Welsh somehow dictate that the $500.00 per acre commission somehow is 
actually a prohibited net listing. Wardley's claim for commissions, however, is based upon 
the Contract, drafted by Welsh, that by its own terms is a complete and integrated contract. 
Paragraph 14 of the Contract states, "This Instrument together with its addenda, any attached 
exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitute the entire Contract between the parties and 
supercedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, 
understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties." (R. at 276.) The parol evidence rule precludes evidence 
of prior negotiations attempting to vary the express terms of an integrated contract which 
contains such merger language. Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital. 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981). 
Thus, Welsh may not, by some supposed prior oral discussions, seek to construe the $500.00 
per acre flat commission fee into something else. 
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Even if the prior conversations between Welsh and Young could properly be 
considered on the net listing question, Welsh's own expert, Arnold Stringham, admitted at 
trial that preliminary conversations regarding a net amount to the seller which result in a 
written agreement of a flat fee do not constitute a net listing, as follows: 
Q. What I'm saying is we have talked about the fact that I want to end up 
with 20,000, and during our discussions we decide how I'm going to end up 
with the 20,000 by letting you have $1,000 an acre out of the purchase price, 
and we write it up that way. Is that a net listing? 
A. No. 
(R. at 696.) Welsl ung may have preliminarily discussed the amount Welsh needed 
to realize from the sale of his property and Welsh's preliminary thinking as to how he wanted 
to arrive there. The Contract, though, unambiguously sets the commission at $500.00 per 
acre, which, as Welsh's own expert agreed, does not constitute a net listing. The trial court 
agreed. Welsh is simply attempting to re-plow the field of facts from which the trial court 
gleaned its findings. Moreover, Welsh has not defended the basis for his assumptions that 
any violation of the Real Estate Division rules automatically precludes a commission. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
WELSH'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS ANSWER ONLY DAYS BEFORE TRIAL. 
Rule 15 of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE states that, "a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
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given when justice so requires." The decision of whether amendment should be allowed 
remains in the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed on appeal 
"unless appellant establishes an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice." Chadwick v. 
Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App. 1988); see also, Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange. 
663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). "Utah courts should consider the following factors in determining 
whether to allow amendment: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; 
and (3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party." Swift Stop. Inc. v. Wight. 845 P.2d 
250,253 (Utah App. 1992); see also, Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350, 
1359 (Utah App. 1990). The trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Welsh's 
Motion to Amend, as the factors which determine whether amendment should be allowed 
were not met, as set forth below. 
A. Welsh's Motion to Amend Was Not Timely and Welsh Did Not Offer Adequate 
Justification for the Delay. 
"Appellate courts uphold a trial court's denial of a motion to amend if the 
amendment is sought late in the course of litigation, if the movant was aware of the facts 
underlying the proposed amendment long before its filing, and if there is not adequate 
explanation for the delay." Swift Stop. 845 P.2d at 253. Wardley was served with 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer literally on the eve of the final dispositive trial in this 
action. The trial was set for Monday, December 16, 1996, but the Plaintiff was not served 
with Welsh's Motion to Amend until Thursday, December 12, 1996, after 5:00 p.m., leaving 
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only one full business day for the Plaintiff to fully respond to the Motion to Amend and to 
prepare for trial on any new issues raised in the Amended Answer. (R. at 393, 398.) Welsh 
had delayed these proceedings on a previous occasion when Wardley filed a Motion for 
Summary Jiidgment. Welsh sought and received in the initial summary judgment hearing 
generous leave of the court to continue the hearing to a later date to allow him to take "such 
depositions as the Defendant deems necessary for purposes of the Court's consideration of 
this summary judgment." (R. at 175-76.) In other words, had the trial court not cut Welch 
additional slack to find facts in his own favor ^ * hich he did i i.ot ha\ e at the hearing, "Welsh 
did not have legitimate basis to preclude entry of summary judgment at that point. Welsh 
was given until October 31,1996, to complete these depositions, which constituted the final 
discovery conducted by Welsh in this action. (R. at 176.) 
Wardley's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted partial summary judgment in 
Wardley's favor, scheduling trial on the remaining issue for November 21,1996. (R. at 336-
37; R. at 329.) As no new discovery was conducted after October 31, 1996, Welsh would 
have been awa* the facts upon which he later sought to amend his Answer at that time, 
yet he took no action to amend. The trial date was then continued to December 16, 1996, at 
Welsh's request, when he changed counsel. (R. at 339-40.) In spite of the amount of time 
that passed after the completion of discovery, and the additional delays which occurred in the 
73179.WA770.111 25 
proceedings, and despite the trial court's giving of generous leeway throughout the 
proceedings, Welsh waited until effectively one business day before trial to seek leave to 
amend, without offering any adequate reason for the delay. Based upon the untimeHness of 
Welsh's the Motion to Amend, the Court acted well within its discretion in denying that 
Motion. 
B. Amendment Would Have Resulted Unfair Prejudice to Wardley. 
At the time of the filing of Welsh's Motion to amend, the case had developed and 
partial summary judgment had been entered, based upon the posture of the pleadings. To 
allow amendment to raise new issues effectively one day before trial would clearly have 
resulted in an unfair disadvantage to Wardley. The Court in Chadwick recognized the merit 
of such concerns by stating, "The amendment of pleadings on the eve of trial causes great 
disruption to the legal process and is unfair to an opponent who has conducted discovery, 
fully prepared the case, and scheduled trial time based on the moving party's prior 
pleadings." If amendment had been allowed, at the very least, Wardley would been forced 
to seek a continuance of the trial date, would have had to again prepare for trial to address 
the new issues, and possibly would have been compelled to seek additional discovery on 
these issues. This disruption and delay in the proceedings would have resulted in unfair 
prejudice to Wardley, confirming that the trial court's denial of the Motion to Amend was 
proper. 
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ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
WARDLEY ITS ATTORNEYS' FEES 
A. Any Ambiguity in the Contract Should Have Been Construed Against Welsh as 
the Drafter When the Intentions of the Contracting Parties Were Not Otherwise 
Revealed by Extrinsic Evidence. 
Attorney's fees are recoverable if allowed by statute, contract, or if equity permits. 
Ranch Homes. Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp.. 592 P.2d 620, 625-26 (Utah 1979). The 
Contract herein vides that attorneys' fees should be awarded as follows: "In any action 
arising out of this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees." (Real Estate Purchase Contract at f 17, R. at 424.) (Emphasis added). The 
trial court held, as a matter of law, that Wardley, as a third-party beneficial) to the contract, 
was not a ngnts under that section. Addendum #1 to Real Estate Purchase Contract 
specifically identifies and provides for the Plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary of the 
Contract, as follows: 
While Wardley BH&G has no agency relationship with neither [sic] the Seller 
nor the Buyer, the Seller agrees to pay $500.00 per acre to Wardley BH&G, at 
settlement. 
(R. at 425.) 
The rights of third-party beneficiaries are determined by the intentions of the parties 
to the subject contract, and accordingly, in this case the trial coir focused its efforts on 
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determining the intentions of the contracting parties to establish whether the attorney's fees 
provision applied to Wardley. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore. 652 P.2d 1314, 
1315 (Utah 1982). The trial court found: 
It is not clear from the contract whether the term "prevailing party" was 
intended to apply only to the original parties to the contract, or whether it may 
be extended to a third-party beneficiary such as the plaintiff. Because the 
contract is ambiguous on this point the Court must look to extrinsic evidence 
to determine the parties intent. There was no evidence at the trial on the 
application of the attorney's fee provision to the plaintiff. In the absence of 
such evidence the Court concludes that the plaintiff is not entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees. 
(Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; R. at 477-78.) The Court properly 
first referred to the contract to surmise the contracting parties' intentions. 
It is a well-accepted principal of contract law that the court first looks to the "four 
comers of the agreement to determine the intentions of the parties. The use of extrinsic 
evidence is permitted only if the document appears to incompletely express the parties' 
agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). (Citations omitted.) When the Court 
determined, however, that there was no extrinsic evidence presented at trial regarding the 
application of the attorney's fee provision to Wardley, the contract should then have been 
construed against the drafter. In essence, the court provided Wardley the benefit of some, 
but not all, contract interpretation provisions. "If a contract is ambiguous, it will be 
construed against the drafter if extrinsic evidence fails to clarify the intent of the parties." 
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Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 64-64 (Utah App. 1994); see also, 
Wilburn v. Interstate Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1988). 
Instead of proceeding to the next step and construing the contract against the drafter 
when the contracting parties' intentions were not revealed by extrinsic evidence, the trial 
court improperly denied attorneys' fees without following this rule of contract interpretation. 
Construing the attorney's fee provision of the Contract against Welsh, as the drafter, would 
have resolved any ambiguity in that provision in Wardley's favor, entitling it to an award of 
its attorney's fees ai id i equii ing reversal of the trial court's decision on this issue. 
B. The Unambiguous Wording of the Contract Entitles Wardley to Its Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs. 
The attorneys' fee provision of the Contract contains no language restricting an award 
of attorneys fees to parties to the Contract. Instead, this provision is drafted in much 
broader terms, directing that a "party" who is entitled to its attorneys fees is the prevailing 
party in an action arising out of this contract—making no reference whatsoever to the parties 
to the Contract itself. The clear and unambiguous wording of the Contract requires that 
Wardley be awarded its attorneys' fees in this action, as both :»fthe requir - -ts of the 
attorney's fee provision are met: (1) This is an action arising out of the contract, and (2) 
Wardley is the prevailing party in this action. Even if the Contract were not clear on this 
point, which Wardley argues that it is, any ambiguities in the Contract as to whether Wardley, 
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as a named beneficiary, is appropriately entitled to attorney's fees should be construed against 
Welsh as the drafter of the contract for the reasons set forth above. 
C. Other Jurisdictions Have Awarded Attorneys' Fees to a Third-Party Beneficiary 
As the Prevailing Party in an Action Based on the Contract. 
While Utah has not specifically addressed the issue of whether a litigant who was not 
a signatory party to a contract can recover attorney's fees in an action based upon the 
contract, several neighboring jurisdictions have awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party in a contract action, even when the successful party was not a party to the contract 
which formed the basis of the dispute. National Indemnity Co. v. St. Paul Insurance 
Companies. 724 P.2d 578, 581 (Ariz. App. 1985); Golden West Insulation v. Stardust 
Investment Corp.. 615 P.2d 1048 (Or. App. 1980). 
The Oregon Court of Appeals also addressed this issue in Golden West Insulation as 
the Court considered Oregon Revised Statutes 20.096(1), which states: 
In any action or suit on a contract, where such contract specifically provides 
that attorney fees and costs incurred to enforce the provisions of the contract 
shall be awarded to one of the parties, the prevailing party, whether that party 
is the party specified in the contract or not, at trial or on appeal, shall be 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees in addition to costs and necessary 
disbursements. 
The disputed contract in Golden West also provided that in the event of litigation, the 
prevailing party would be entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney fees. Id. at 1057. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the prevailing party, although not a party to the contract, 
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was entitled to attorneys fees. Id. at 1058. Wardley is equally entitled to its attorneys fees 
since both the disputed contract and the relevant statute similarly provide for such an award 
to the prevailing party as set forth below. 
In jurisdictions where attorney's fees have been denied to third-party beneficiaries of 
a contract, the denial has been based upon other grounds which are clearly distinguishable 
from the present case. For example, the Washington Court of Appeals refused to grant 
attorney's fees to a third-party beneficiary under a contract because the terms of the contract 
were not central to the dispute and because the third-party beneficiary himself would not 
have been bound under the contract to pay attorney's fees. Watkins v. Restorative Care 
Center. Inc.. 831 P.2d 1085,1094 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1992). In the present case, the contract 
was central to the dispute and by statute the Plaintiff also arguably would have been bound 
by the attorney's fee provision of the contract as Utah law provides Ilia I I In n >mt may award 
attorney's fees to either party in a civil action if the contract allows at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 allows that when a contract provides for attorney's 
fees to at least one of the parties in an action based upon a written contract, the court may 
properly award attorney's fees to either party that prevails, by stating: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
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promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees. (Emphasis Supplied). 
The contract which is the basis of the action herein clearly provides for an award of 
attorney's fees to at least one party. Accordingly, in addition to the Plaintiff being entitled 
to its attorney's fees pursuant to the wording of the contract alone, the Plaintiff is, 
alternatively, entitled to such an award by operation of the above provision, which provides 
for attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
Welsh claims that since this statutory provision was not set forth by Wardley in its 
Complaint, Wardley cannot now claim its attorneys' fees based upon that statute. The sole 
basis, however, for Wardley's claim of attorneys' fees is the contract, which is then extended 
by statute. Without the contractual provisions, Wardley would have no basis for its claim, 
evidencing the fact that Wardley properly set forth its claim based on the contract in its 
pleadings. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reason set forth herein, Wardley respectfully requests that the decision of the 
trial court in granting partial summary judgment and in subsequently granting Wardley 
judgment for th •t of its commissions under the Contract be affirmed, and, further, 
that the trial court's denial of Wardley's attorney's fees be reversed 
no ^ DATED this Jrf "day of September, 1997. 
NeiTR. S^in 
Annette F. Sorensen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Cross-Appellant 
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I certify that on the y p day of September, 1997,1 served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, by causing the 
same to be hand delivered to the following: 
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
73179.WA770.111 34 
ADDENDUM 
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' ^ I j O ...EAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT •_ J 
********* # I'M* b • t*Qaar.blrvJtr»g Co««/«cl UUh SUU l a ~ c»<n#W« »»«< ic««««^ « ^ « t * ^ ^ < ^ »«« ^  *<>r^ * ^ * ^ « « T ^ « ^ ^ « S < < ^ """T • • • • « « — . . • 
R E A L T O R W^««r «g'«-t Jn »rrUngJU -tier or d«M« pr<rrt»JorM ofetlt term. B f ou <*«W Wool or Ux «Mc«. COrt«uA your •nom*y or U i aOVHoc. 
7 /^y "^ 6A0NEST MONEY RECEIPT 
The Buyer / r 5 v T \ / /tpT?^&?^/ rS / 4 v r r x ^ y / T f C offers to purchase the Properly described below and delivers 
to Broke /aok as Eamei l Money Oepoalt J '7>r> ^ rr-n zT | n the (orm o(... (4 f/SffY/j. to be deposited 
wlthln^thpee business days after Acceptance ol (nlj oflerto purchase by all partip. 
. Received by 
Brokerage ' Phone Number ' 
^Z^X^pJ- County X c ^ Z # S = - ^ L. , 
Unless excluded herein, this sale shaft induda all fixtures presently attached to the 1 
rqulpment. water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtur 
door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awning j . Installed television antenna, satellite dishes and system, wall-to-wall carpets, automatic garage door 
1. PROPERTY: T£JW "/&'/ ,1 ^ ) ^ ( A /f/ZiffTrsf r/*/F/T\./ 4^-fV 7". 
fifcST *72*<&afU.  ^2rp-/ ^L-, .Utari ' Ub/Z/LtS /tfaaf-
1.1 Included Hems. l  l  i , i  l  ll I cl e ll i  l     Property: plumbing, healing, air-conditioning and 
venting fixtures and equip e t, ater eater, ilt-i  a lia ces, lig t fixt res a  l s, at roo  fixt res, curtains and draperies and rods, window and 
City 
opener and transmitters), lenclng. trees and "shrubs. The following ptryocul property shaft also be included In this sale and conveyed under separate BH1 of 
Sale with warranties as to title: 
trees an 
$4-v 
1.2 Cxcluded Items. The following Items are excluded from this sale 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. Buyer agrees to pay for the Property as follows: 
S "?^ (^^f £* £am««t Money O*po«tt 
J Exieting Loan: Buyer Agrees to assume and pay an existing loan in this approximate amount presently payable at J . 
per month Including principal. Interest (presently %X. % per annum). Q real estate taxes. O property Insurance premium 
mtxi Q mortgage Insurance premium. Buyer agrees to pay any transfer and assumption fees. Seller O shall Q shad not be 
released from Ha ©fifty on said loan. Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above ana the actual 
balance at Closing shall be adjusted In Q Cash Q Other 
S Proceeds from New Loan: Buyer reserves the right to apply for any of the following (cans under the terms described below. 
O Conventional U FHA O VA O Other . Seller agrees to pay J toward 
O'rscount Points and Buyer's other loan »r\6 dosing costs, to be allocated at Buyer's discretion. 
O For a fixed rate loan: Amortized and payable over years. Interest shall not exceed H p«f annum; monthly principal and 
Interest payment shall not exceed S . or 
O For an Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM): Amortized and payable over years; Initial Interest rale shall not exceed H per 
annum; initial monthly principal and Interest payments shall not exceed S Maximum Ule Time Interest rate shall not 
exceed % per annum. 
•* Seder Financing: (See attached Seller Financing Addendum) • 
S Other. fttH^r? jUrS Jsjfj? ^r}/T7ZJj^{7^ /?{{, <r7*L<C,J Srf/fJYAfX 
* - • * £ # ffifl °^- &«*«"<=• o* Purchase Prlca in Caxh at Cfcaing — ^ W ^ / , / > # / ) > ^ , ^ ^ _ ^/ ' /G+**//> L —//JpfrJtVx-
s S S f e e r o U . Purchase Price ^ ^ f ^ ' ^ % g /fcf**- ~ / - * ^ 
2.1 Exftillng/New Loan Application, Buyer agrees to make application lor a/loan spedfiedabova wanicr calendar days (Application Date) after 
Acceptance. Buyer win have made Loan Application only when Buyer has: (a) completed, signed, and delivered to the Lender the inhial loan application ami 
documentation required by the Lander; and (b) paid all loan application fees as required by the Lender. Buyer wiQ continue to provide the Lender with any 
additional documentation as required by the Lender. II. within seven ca^ndMr days after receipt of written request from Seller. Buyer faHs to provide lo Seller 
written evidence that Buyer has made Loan Application by the Application Date, then Seller may. prior to the Qualification Date below, cancel this Contract 
by providing written notice to Buyer. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of such written notice, shall release to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as 
Setter's exclusive remedy, the Eameal Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written authorization from Buyer. 
2J2 Qualification. Buyer and the Properly must qualify for a loan for which application has been made under section 2.1 within calendar days 
(Qualification Date) after Acceptance. The Property is deemed qualified if. on of before OH QuafHIcatien Date, fne Property. In its current condition and for 
the Buyer's Intended use. has appraised at a value not less than the Total Purth^s* Price. Buyer rs deemed qualified If, on or before the Qualification Oate. 
the Lender verifies In writing that Buyer h i s been approved as of the verification data. 
2-3 Qualification Contingency. H Seder has not previously voided this Contract as provided In Section 2.1. and either the Property or Buyer has (ailed to 
qualify on or before the Quaflflcallon Oate. either party may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party within three calendar days 
after the Qualification Oate. otherwise Buyer and the Property are deemed qualified. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of such written notice, shall 
return to 8uyer the Earnest Money Oeposlt without the requirement of arty further wrlaen authorization of Setter. 
3 . CLOSING. This transaction shad be d o s e d on or before T7(fj^./ /&
 # tg. Qt/ doelng ahaA occur where (a) Buyer and Seller have. 
signed and delivered to each other (or to the escrow/title company), alldocumerits required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instructions 
and by applicable 'aw. and (b) the monies required to be pa*i \toCtt these documents, have been delivered lo the escrow/title company in the form of 
cashier's check, collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shaA each payooe-hatt(1/2)of the escrow dos ing fee. unless otherwise agreed by the parties 
•In writing. Taxes and assessments for the current year, rmut^ and Interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set lorth In this Section. Unearned 
deposits on tenancies shaft be transferred to Buyer at Cloving. Prorations set forth In thfs Section, shall be made as of £)<$ate of Oo«lng Q date of 
possess ion Q other . 
4. POSSESSION. Unless otherwise agreed In writing by the parties. Seder shall deliver possession lo Buyer within 'T- hours after dot ing . 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract the Isttng agent . represents 
O Seller Q Buyer, and the telling agent represents Q Seller Q Buyer. Buyer and Setter confirm that prior to signing M s 
Contract written disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to him/her. ( ) Buyer's WtUli ( J Seder's Initials. 
i . T n i . E TO PROPERTY ANO T T n ^ INSURANCE, (a) Seller .Sas.c< shail rtave) at Closing 
general warranty deed, free of financial encumbrances as warranted undnt Section 10.$ (b) Seller agrees to pay for und furnish Buyer »t doelng with a 
current standard form owner's policy of title Insurance In the amount of the Total Purchaee Price; (c) the title policy shall conform wim Seder's obligations 
ucMlcf subsections (a) and (b) above. Unless otherwise agreed \tmtet subsection 8.4. the commitment shall conform with the title Insurance commitment 
provided under Section 7. 
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than calender days after AcctpUnca. Seller wtt deOvar to Buyer the following Seller Obctosures: (a) 
• Seller property condition disclosure for the Properly, signed and dated by Seller; (b) a commitment for the poOcy of title Insurance required under Section 
6. to be Issued by the title Insurance company chosen by Seller. Including copies of alt documents listed as Exceptions on the Commltmenr.(c) a copy of aft 
loan documents relating to any loan now existing which wfH encumber the Property after Ctoalng; and (d) a copy of all leaaes affecting (he Property not 
expiring prior to Ooelng. Seller agrees to pay any title corrunltment cancellation Charge under subsection (bL 
1. GENERAL CONTfN GENClES. In addition to QuaJOca Won uod^f Section 22 this offer Is: (a) sublet to fiuyer't approval of tr^ content of each of tne items 
referenced In Section 7 above; and (b) Q Is Q Is not subject to Buyer's approval of an Inspection of the Property. The Inspection shad be paid lor by Buyer 
and shall be conducted by an Individual/company of 8uyef*s choke. Seller agrees to fully cooperate with such Inspection and a walk-through Inspection 
under Section 11 and to make the Property available for are same. 
8.1 Buyer shall have calendar days after Acceptance Wi which to review the content of Sefter Disclosures, and. H the Inspection contingency 
appr«es. to complete and evaluate the Inspection of V>e Property, and to determine. X. In Buyer's sole discretion, the content of efl SeAer Disclosures 
(including the Property Inspection) is acceptable. 
8.2 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Sefler regarding a Seller Disclosure or the Property Inspection within the time provided In subsection 8.1 
above, that docutr^M or Inspection wilt be deemed •pqttr^l ot wehred by Buyer. 
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6 3J< Buyff objects Buyer and Sc«er shall have seven czicnc,f^\z ahcr receipt of the objections to <«so<«« uVyer*sob|>cit6«s.SeTl« <bui shall not 
« recused to. resolve Buyer's Objections. U Buyer s objections'^ hi resolved wiihm th« seven calendar days. Buyer may vo*d tftis Contract by providing 
*?ir.cn nonce to Seller wtinm tne same seven calendar days The Brokerage upon receipt ol a copy of Buyer's written nonce, shait roturn to Buyer tne 
£ jrn«<( Money Oepoiil without tine requirement ol any further wnrien autnoriratibn from Setter, ft tfus Contract Is not voided by 8uy«r. Buyer's objection it 
deemed to have )>een waived However, this waiver does not enact those items warranted In Section 11. 
e\4 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Section 6.3 shall b^^r^rt^ng ar\d shall bespectficatiy enforceable as covenants ol this Contract 
«. SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This o««r/s made subject to 
The terms of attached Addendum f JL— Bre Incorporated Into th's Contract by this reference. 
tQ. SELLER'S LIM1TE0 WARRANTIES. Sellor's warranties to Buyor regarding the condition of the Properly are limited to the following 
10.1 When seller delivers possession of the Property to 8uycr. It w«U be broom-clean and Utt ol debris and personal belongings; 
tO 2 Seller will deliver possession ol the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, heating, cooling, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler 
systems, appliances and fireplaces In working order. 
10 .3 Seller will deliver possession ol the Property to Buyer with the roof »tul foundation free of leaks known to Seller: 
10.4 Seller will deliver possession ol the Property to Buyer wiih any private well or seotic tank servta the Property in working order and in compliance 
with governmental regulations: 
10.5 Seller win be responsible'for repairing any ol Seller's moving-related damage to the Properly: 
10.6 At Closing. Seller will bring current all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer and will discharge all 
such obligations which Buyer has not so assumed: and 
10.7 As of Dosing. Seller has no knowledge ol any claim or notice oi an environmental, building or zoning code violation regarding the Property which 
has not been resolved. 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTEO ANO 1NCLUOEO tTEMS. Before Closing. Buyer may conduct a •walk-through- inspection of the Property to 
determine whether or not items warranted by Seller In Section 10.1.102,10-3 and 10.4 are In the warranted condition and to verify items included in Section 
1.1 ar« presently on the Property. If any Item Is not In the warranted condition. Seller wUI correct, repair or replace U as necessary or. with the consent of 
Buyer, escrow an amount at Closing to provide (or such repair or replacement The Buyer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" Inspection, or to claim 
during the "walk-through" Inspection that ihe Property does not Include ail Items referenced In Section L1.or Is not in the condition warranted in Section 
10. shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 or of the warranties contained In Section 10. 
12. CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes In any existing leases shait be made, no new leases entered into, and no substantial 
alterations or Improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. II Buyer or Seller Is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behall 
warrants his or her authority to do so Mt\4 to bind Buyer ot Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Instrument together with Its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Setter Disclosures constitute the etwxtn Contract 
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the 
parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by'written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract. Including but not limited to the disposition oi the Earnest 
Money Oeposil the breach or termination ol this Contract cr the services relating to this transaction, shall first be submitted to mediation in accordance 
with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seder Mediation Rules ol the American Arbitration Association. Disputes shall Include representations made by the 
parties, any Broker or other person or entity In connection with the sale, purchase, financing, condition a other aspect of the Property to which this Contract 
pertains, including without (imitation, allegations ol concealment, misrepresentation, negligence and/or fraud. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of 
mediation. Any agreement signed by the parties pursuant to the mediation shall be binding. II mediation (ails, the procedures applicable and remedies 
available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing In this Section 1S shall prohibit arty party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. By 
marking this box O , and adding their (niUals. the Buyer ( J.and the Setter ( J. agree that mediation under this Section 1 Sis not mandatory, but is 
optional upon agreement of ail parties. 
16 .0 EFAULT, U Buyer defaults. Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Oepostt as liquidated damages or to return the Eame t l Money Deposit 
and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights, tf Seller defaults. In addition to return ol the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from Setter as 
liquidated damages, e sum equal to the Earnest Money OepesU. or to sue Seller (or specific penormance and/or damage*, if Buyer elects to accept the 
liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where e Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy the 
parties Intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be aveftabfe under common law. 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out ol this Contract, the prevailing party shaft1 be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
U . DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Oeposlt shall not be released unless Kb authorized by: (a) Section 2. Section 6.3 or Sectic-n 
15: (b) separate written agreement of the parties; or (c) court order. 
13. ABROGATION. Except lor express warranties made In this Contract, the provisions ol this Contract shad not apply alter Closing. 
' 20. RISK OF LOSS. Alt risk of toss or damage1 to the Property shall be borne by Setter untft Ooslag. 
2 1 . TIM E IS 0 F TH E ESSENCE. Time is of (he essence, regarding the dates set forth In this transaction. Extensions must be agreed to in writing by all parties 
Performance under each Section ol this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by StfO PM Mountain Time on the stated date. 
22. FACSIMILE (FAX] DOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission of any signed original document, and retiansmisslon of any signed facsimile transmission 
shall be the same as delivery of an original If the transaction Involves multiple Buyers or Seders, (acslrnae transmissions may be executed In counterparts 
2 J . ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when $elier or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a J signs the oiler or counter where note* 
I T inrfs-nt? * ~ e ; ! i - r c : c**.£ f>J conmu-Icates to the ctfcsr party or »h«r cCer party's agent that the ofter or counteroffer has b«en signed as required. 
24. OFFER ANO TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If Setter does not accept this offer by 
_C3 AM Q PMJ^ounuin Time 19 .this offer shaft lapse: and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money 
A^s/.h/ 
j Signature) (Otter Oate) (Buyer's Signature) (Offer Oate) 
ibove date shall be the Offer Reference Oate. 
(Notice Address) (Phone? (Notice Address} • (Phone) 
IkCCEPTANCE/REJECTlON/COUNTER OFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
Q Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Sailer Accepts the) foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
7
 fijj^^ ^/JI/M 9.'o£>~ 
(Oatey (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Notice Address) (Notice Address) 
O Rejection: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer (Seller's Initials) (Oate) _ (Time) 
O Counter Offer. Seller presents lor Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or modifications es specified In the attached 
Counter Offer f . -
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1) Buyer herewith stuff deposit a non-rcfundablc earnest money deposit in the amount of 
twenty-thousand and 00/00 (520.000.00) with Gaurdian Title Company wliich shall be credited 
toward* the total vaJc^ s price at closing. In the event Buyer docx not perform and settle on the 
date specified herein, r.aid deposit shall be deemed to have been earned by the seller and Guardian 
Title aliaJI Immediately dispurse same to idler 
2) The price herein shaJl include, the costs of aJl engineering and surveys and fees to the City 
of West Jordan necessary to obtain final plat appioval from the Planning Commision, alt fees 
related to the Southern Pacific Railroad crossing permit, all fees related to IheWelby Jacobs Canal 
ciussing per/rut, all fees and costs related to securing the easement across the Lcnictz property. 
3) Buyer shall be responsible for payment of all storm drain fets and bonding requirements. 
4) Settlement of phase I and 2 shall occur on or before July.l? 1994. 
6) Seller shall provide and dedicate any and all acreage required, to the City of West Jordan, 
for the purpose of the psoposcd storm water management pond / park. However. Buyer shall be 
responsible for any ami all improvements of said pond / park as well as ihe construction of same 
as shall be determined and required by the City of West Jordan, Buyer shall thereby be entitled to 
any and all reimbursements and compensation that shall be approved and granted by the City of 
West Jordan. (This dues not apply to construction of sanitary sewer lines.) 
o r h*£ C-oST 
7) Buyer shall be responsible for all on-site and off-site improvements as required by the City 
of VYcat Jordnn 
8} Buyer agrees to allow access to the balance of the subdivision as .ict forth on the 
prefmunary plat, as well as all subsequent final plats, including all rights of way and access to 
utility connections at no cost to the Seller. Buyer further agrees not to establish or create any 
protective strips or other le^sl impediments to the Seller's full access to the balance of the 
subdivision for streets, curb, guttering, sidewalk and all utilities, including water, sewer, natural 
gas, storm drain, etc. 
>) rdi wuiiuili'jfta herein shall survive dosing and settlement. 
10) Settlement shall be held by Guardian Title Company. 
11) Buyer shall be credited in the amount o (Ttt.GlJ at the first settlement specified 
herein aa aii oIT-set fo: utT-site sewer line installation. .J 
<T con+.) e.<<u-c.-x<
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Neil R. Sabin, USB No. 2840 
Annette F. Sorensen, USB No. 6989 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
WARDLEY CORPORATION, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
GRANT WELSH, ] 
Defendant. ) 
> ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
> JUDGMENT 
> Civil NO/950007889CV 
• Judge Robin W. Reese 
The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment came on originally for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, presiding, on September 27, 1996 
and was continued for hearing to November 4, 1996. The Plaintiff appeared on both occasions 
by its counsel, Neil R. Sabin, Esq., and the Defendant was personally present at both hearings 
and was represented at both hearings by Michael A. Katz, Esq. 
The Court, having reviewed Affidavits, memoranda and other documents, and having 
heard oral arguments, and having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as it relates solely to 
questions as to: (a) whether the commission arrangements constitute a "net listing," and the 
effect thereof as it relates to the Defendant's defenses to payment of a commission; and (b) 
issues of attorney's fees and costs. 
2. The Plaintiff is granted summary judgment as to all other issues in this case 
against the Defendant. 
3. Trial of this matter shall be scheduled with the trial to be limited to the following: 
a. Whether the arrangements by which the Plaintiff claims an interest in 
commissions constitute a "net listing" in violation of state laws and regulations. 
b. Whether the Defendant has a defense to the payment of commissions by 
virtue of a determination that these arrangements constitute a "net listing." 
c. Determination as to any award, if any, of attorney's fees and costs. 
53914. WA770.111 -2-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the /> ' 'day of November, 1996, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing proposed ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by causing the 
same to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Michael A. Katz 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, UT 84123 
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December 1 6 , 1996 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Beginning of tape 2763.) 
THE CLERK: Please stand. Court is now 
in session. You may be seated. 
THE COURT: Given the lateness of the 
hour, I'll be quick and to the point. The first and 
sole issue, as we discussed at the beginning, left to 
be tried was whether or not this was a net listing. 
If it is, it's a violation of the rules and, 
therefore, in my judgment at least, the plaintiff is 
not entitled to sue for a commission under Utah law. 
The question whether this is a net 
listing really has two components: Number one, is it 
a listing at all; and number two, if it's a listing, 
is it a net listing. The definition of a net listing 
has been provided, and it's pretty straightforward, 
but it does require finding first that there was a 
listing. 
The question, therefore, as to whether 
this is a listing I would respond to as follows: 
Mr. Stringham said in his testimony that listing and 
agency are more or less synonymous. In fact, he kept 
saying, "I don't really understand why we're 
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approaching it this way. The real question is whether 
or not Mr. Young was the agent of Mr. Welsh. That's 
what I think we ought to be focusing on," words to 
that effect that he kept saying. And he said that 
agency can be implied. There doesn't have to be a 
written agreement for purposes of agency, that if you 
act like an agent, then you probably are one, I think 
was his summary or words to that effect. 
But to have a listing, he said in this 
case, that Mr. Young must have been an agent of 
Mr. Welsh. He must have in effect listed the 
property. Mr. Welsh must have listed the property 
with Mr. Young, otherwise ergo you have no net listing 
because you don't have a listing. I'm persuaded by 
all the evidence in this case that Mr. Welsh and 
Mr. Young did not have a listing agreement. There was 
no listing, so there could be no net listing. 
My responsibility, of course, is to look 
at all the evidence, to reconcile the evidence where 
it can be reconciled and where it can't be 
reconciled to decide between competing two pieces of 
evidence what in fact the truth is. And I find the 
following evidence to be persuasive: Number one, that 
during Mr. Welsh's testimony today he indicated that 
his only instructions to Mr. Young was that the 
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property must sell for at least $18,500, and that 
there would be no written listing agreement, that he 
wouldn't give it in writing, that that was never his 
intention. In fact, he assumed that Mr. Young had 
written agreements with the prospective buyers and 
that they would be responsible for the commission, and 
therefore he would not enter any sort of listing 
agreement with Mr. Young. That was his testimony 
today, and, of course, that certainly has a bearing on 
what —whether there was a listing or not because that 
was their — Mr. Young's intention at the time he 
first dealt with Mr. Young regarding the property in 
question here. 
Number two, Mr. Young, when he signed the 
contract on May 31st of 1994, his own handwriting 
stated that Mr. Young — Mr. Welsh said in his — in 
writing in his own hand that Mr. Young was not his 
agent. In other words, he said there was no agreement 
between the two of them for Young to list the 
property. 
I found it interesting that this language 
was added by Mr. Welsh because Mr. Peterson, the 
prospective buyer, didn't want to be seen as paying a 
commission. He wanted the seller to pay the 
commission so that he could obtain financing for the 
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full 19,000 per acre. If it were broken out, as I 
understand it, he was paying only eighteen five but 
paying a commission of five, that he couldn't get 
financing for the full 19,000 per acre, so he wanted 
to be shown that Mr, Welsh was in fact paying the 
commission. 
But the language regarding the agency 
that was included in that addendum — and I believe it 
was paragraph twelve of the addendum — appears to be 
entirely gratuitous and was added by Mr. Welsh. No 
reason to do that based on the instruction to 
Mr. Peterson. He just didn't want to be seen as 
paying the commission. But the language of the agency 
was written there by Mr. Welsh in his own hand and 
that would seem to reflect his intention. Even though 
the contract between the buyer and the seller is not 
an agency agreement — we kept hearing the witnesses 
saying that over and over — the language in 
Mr. Welsh's own hand would certainly indicate what his 
intention was when he dealt with Mr. Young initially, 
and therefore would have some bearing and be relevant 
on the issue of whether or not there was ever a 
listing. 
And finally, I found it persuasive that 
in the letter dated March 23rd, 1995, Mr. Welsh 
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notified Mr. Young that, "You do not represent me." 
All of this in my judgment adds up to show that 
Mr. Welsh never considered Mr. Young to be his selling 
agent and therefore he didn't list the property with 
him. Because there was no listing, again there could 
be no net listing. Because there was no net listing, 
there was no violation of the rules and there was no 
violation of the statute. Therefore, the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover its commission as a third-party 
beneficiary under the contract between Mr. Peterson 
and Mr. Welsh. 
And I would ask counsel for the plaintiff 
if you would prepare — I know I've just given a short 
summary, but I would ask you to prepare findings and 
conclusions consistent with those that I've 
articulated here from the bench today. The plaintiff 
would also be entitled to costs of court. Now the 
issue remains as to the attorney's fee and whether or 
not the plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary is 
entitled to recover attorney's fees. I'm going to 
take that issue still under advisement and ask you 
each to address it. 
I do have the Tracy Collins case that was 
submitted by the defendant today, and there was some 
other material on that issue submitted by the 
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plaintiff earlier when the motion for summary judgment 
— but I'm still not quite sure what the state of the 
law is in Utah. 
It would be clear to me that neither 
Mr. Peterson nor Mr. Welsh even thought of whether or 
not the third-party beneficiary would be entitled to 
attorney's fees. I'm sure that that issue never 
crossed their minds. If it would require some proof 
that they intended and thought about that point when 
they drafted this contract and the addendum, then it 
wouldn't seem to me that the plaintiff is entitled to 
prevail on the issue of attorney's fees, but I'll give 
you each a chance to brief that if you would like to. 
And maybe the best way to do that, to save time, is to 
have you within 14 days, if you think that's fair, 
just submit a memoranda, each — submit it at the same 
time for me to consider, and then I'll rule on that 
point after I've had a chance to read your 
memorandum. Any objection to that? 
MR. RAMPTON(?): No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. SABIN(?): No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, 14 days I'll expect a 
memorandum from each of you on that point, and then 
I'll address the issue of attorneys' fees. But, 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. *(801) 521-5222* 
197 
Counsel, you can go ahead and begin drafting the 
findings and conclusions if you would. 
Since you've been asked to prepare those, 
do you have any questions? Is there anything I need 
to address that would assist you in that? 
MR- SABIN(?): One thing that we also 
perhaps ought to brief: We had passed previously in 
the memorandum before the Court that we treat the 
depositions as (unintelligible) under the 
circumstances. And I'm wondering if we maybe should 
address that also in court. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. RAMPTON(?): This is my first news on 
it, your Honor, and I'm happy to read the question. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you include 
that. 
MR. SABIN(?): We raised that very 
briefly in the previous memorandum, but the reason for 
that being that that arose after the first summary 
judgment hearing. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SABIN(?): At least we would like to 
address it in order to have everything before the 
Court in one document. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll ask you to 
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include that in your memorandum as well. 
MR. SABIN(?): Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(End of proceedings on tape 2763.) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, LYNN M. ROBINS, Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public for the State of Utah, 
residing in Salt Lake County, certify: 
That the foregoing reporter's transcript 
of audio-taped proceedings was stenographically 
prepared by me upon listening to tape # 2763 provided 
to me by the office of Vince Rampton of the Third 
District Court trial from 12-16-96 in the case of 
Wardley Corporation versus Grant Welsh; 
That the foregoing reporter's transcript 
of audio-taped proceedings represents a complete 
transcription of my stenographic notes so taken to the 
best of my ability to hear and understand the cassette 
tape of the proceedings; 
I further certify that I am neither 
counsel for nor related to any party to said action nor 
in anywise interested in the outcome thereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name 
and affixed my seal this-T?»* day of 
•1997 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
$ LYNN M.ROBINS 
\s^wM 1282 £ m s-SIC- W W12< 
< > K - ~ ^ V My Commission Expires July 8,1999 
STATE OF UTAH 
°Lyjin M. R o b i n s , C . S . R . , 
N o t a r y P u b l i c 
J 
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Neil R. Sabin, USB No. 2840 
Annette F. Sorensen, USB No. 6989 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
WARDLEY CORPORATION, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
GRANT WELSH, ) 
Defendant. ) 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Civil No. 950007889CV 
> Judge Robin W. Reese 
This matter came for trial before the above-entitled Court on December 16, 1996, the 
Honorable Robin Reese, Judge, presiding. The Plaintiff appeared by and through its counsel 
Neil R. Sabin, and the Defendant appeared personally and by and through his counsel Vincent 
Rampton. Pursuant to the Order of Summary Judgment in this matter, entered November 14, 
1996, the issues reserved for trial were (1) whether or not the arrangements by which the 
Plaintiff claimed a commission constituted an unlawful "net listing" and if so, whether such a 
determination would preclude a commission; and (2) issues of attorney's fees. 
The Defendant called the following witnesses: Randy Young, of Wardley Better Homes 
& Gardens; the Defendant Grant Welsh, and Arnold Stringham. The Defendant then rested. 
T^C* 
The Plaintiff then called Nick Scott as its witness. The Court, having heard testimony, 
examined the witnesses and the credibility thereof, having examined the documents submitted 
as evidence, having heard oral argument, having examined the admissions of the Defendant on 
file herein, and being fully advised in the premises now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to May 31, 1994, the Defendant Grant Welsh owned an interest in certain 
real property situated at approximately 4800 West and 8600 South in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
and commonly referred to as Dorilee Acres (the "Subject Property"). 
2. Wardley Better Homes & Gardens is a Utah corporation doing business as a 
licensed real estate brokerage. 
3. Randy Young is a licensed real estate agent with Wardley Better Homes & 
Gardens. 
4. Prior to May 31, 1994, Randy Young and the Defendant had discussed Randy 
Young's proposal to locate a buyer for the Defendant's properties and, in connection therewith, 
to earn a commission. 
5. The Defendant specifically declined to grant to Mr. Young a listing for the Subject 
Property. While the testimony of Defendant and of Randy Young differs as to the nature of 
understanding or arrangements they arrived at, both parties understood that Mr. Young would 
be attempting to locate a buyer for the Subject Property for which he would seek a commission. 
6. Randy Young advised Leon Peterson of the availability of the Subject Property 
and informed the Defendant of Mr. Peterson's interest in considering purchase of the Subject 
Property. 
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7. The Defendant then contacted Leon Peterson regarding the possible sale of the 
Subject Property. The Defendant prepared a typewritten document setting forth the details of 
his proposal to be presented to Mr. Peterson. 
8. The Defendant and Leon Peterson met to negotiate Mr. Peterson's purchase of 
the Subject Property. The Defendant and Mr. Peterson then prepared a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (the "Contract"). Those persons also agreed to an Addendum A to the contract setting 
forth their agreement, which was the typewritten document the Defendant had prepared, with 
handwritten changes resulting from Defendant's and Mr. Peterson's discussion. During the 
negotiations, Mr. Welsh, in addition to other handwritten changes, inserted on the Addendum 
A the following language: 
While Wardley BH&G has no agency relationship with neither [sic] the 
Seller nor the Buyer, the Seller agrees to pay $500.00 per acre to Wardley 
BH&G, at settlement. 
9. The typewritten portion of Addendum A was prepared by Defendant, and 
Defendant inserted all handwriting on the Addendum A. 
10. Mr. Peterson and Defendant then executed the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
which included the Addendum A with the handwritten additions which Defendant had written. 
11. Pursuant to the Agreement, Phase I of the Subject Property was sold and closed, 
and Plaintiff received a $500.00 per acre commission (for a total of $10,556.80) in connection 
therewith. 
12. Disputes subsequently arose between Defendant and Leon Peterson involving the 
i 
interpretation of paragraph 5 to the Addendum A. Those persons subsequently settled the 
disputes. Subsequently, Defendant, on April 24, 1995, closed the sale to Mr. Peterson of 16.70 
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acres, for which a $500.00 per acre commission is $8,350.00; and, on May 26, 1995, Defendant 
closed the sale to Mr. Peterson of 13.6475 acres, for which a $500.00 per acre commission is 
$6,823.75. 
13. Throughout this transaction, neither Plaintiff nor Randy Young were agents for 
the Defendant, which is evidenced by the testimony of Mr. Welsh, the testimony of Mr. Young, 
the language of the Addendum itself, and a letter from Defendant to Randy Young dated March 
19, 1995, reaffirming no representation. 
'14. ^ i ^ f endan t^eveTc^ BetteiJ^xrfhes &^Gardens to be its agent. 
l x There never was a listing arrangement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
because the Defendant refused to enter into any such listing with the Plaintiff. 
The issues regarding attorneys' fees should be deferred pending the opportunity 
of the parties to submit memoranda of law no later than December 31, 1996. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In order for a net listing agreement to exist, a precondition must happen that a 
listing agreement be in effect. 
2. No listing arrangement of any nature existed between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. Accordingly, no net listing arrangement of any nature existed between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant. 
3. The Plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to judgment against the Defendant for the 
amount of the commissions owing as follows: 
a. For $8,350.00, plus interest thereon at the legal rate since April 24, 1995, 
until paid; and 
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b. For $6,823.75, plus interest thereon at the legal rate since May 26, 1995, 
until paid. 
4. The parties should have until December 31, 1996, to submit to the Court 
Memoranda of Law for the Court to determine whether attorneys' fees can and should be 
awarded to the Plaintiff. Upon a determination by the Court that the Plaintiff is entitled to an 
award of attorneys' fees, the Plaintiff should be entitled to an Order supplementing the judgment 
herein to add the Court's award of such fees as part of the judgment. 
Dated this day of ^ flvA 19?*! • 
BY THE COURT: 
i /Lf^0^m^ 
Honorable Rop^W/'J^eesie t 
District CourtSfi§ge ff$S|::0 '^ :§ | j 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVlfrfe^r-- c bi>>'/ 
I certify that on the ?*—-day of January, 1997, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by causing the same to be 
mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main #1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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Neil R. Sabin, USB No. 2840 
Annette F. Sorensen, USB No. 6989 JA^ " 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. rhl 9 tt^ 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza ^ *'{%&*>* ^ 
60 East South Temple 0/% °°^C0o 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 " " ' 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
WARDLEY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRANT WELSH, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No! 950007889CV 
Judge Robin W. Reese 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED (add language). 
1. The Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant for the following 
amounts: 
a. For $8,350.00, plus interest thereon at the legal rate since April 24, 1995, 
until paid; and 
b. For $6,823.75, plus interest thereon at the legal rate since May 26, 1995, \^]y 
until paid, fl fi'jft 
4. The Court has taken under advisement issues of attorney's fees and costs. The 
\r 
parties shall have until December 31, 1996, to submit to the Court Memoranda of Law for the 
Court to determine whether attorneys' fees can and should be awarded to the Plaintiff Upon 
a determination by the Court that the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, the 
Plaintiff is be entitled to an Order supplementing the judgment herein to add the Court's award 
of such fees as part of this Judgment. 
Dated this CT day of " J ~ (/iv- , 19 / / . 
BY THE COURT: ^ - - _ 
,:***,v»i» < -... -~x 
-WW-* -., '*• \ 
-+ 1 %*--1—^V*"* 'V'~ '" ' ^~7 
Honorable Robin Wl$I^esa%4->-:K\ ' ? t 
District Court JudgeV|^\ >'V£ ^ - S; 
V W * i <• f v. /• 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE v :-~ - : 
I certify that on the P2 day of December, 1996, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing JUDGMENT by causing the same to be mailed by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following-
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main #1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
- 7 
7 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT DIVISION II ty$ , % 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT ^ j f r <? 4$r 
WARDLEY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRANT WELSH, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF ^ 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS \ 
OF LAW 
CASE NO. 950007889 CV 
JUDGE ROBIN W. REESE 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The original contract between Leon Peterson, as the buyer of certain property, 
and the defendant, Grant Welsh, as the seller includes a provision in paragraph 17 awarding 
the prevailing party in any action arising out of that contract a reasonable attorney's fee. 
2. In paragraph 12 of the addendum to the contract it is stated that the seller, 
Grant Welsh, would pay $500.00 per acre to Wardley Better Homes and Gardens at the time 
of settlement. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, and based upon the revised Findings of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law signed by the Court on January 8, 1997, this court now enters 
the following supplementary conclusions of law: 
1. Paragraph 12 of the addendum to the contract specifically makes the plaintiff 
in this case a third-party beneficiary of the said contract and gives the plaintiff enforceable 
rights in the same. 
2. Paragraph 17 of the original contract however permits the prevailing party in 
any action arising out of the contract to recover a reasonable attorney's fee. This paragraph, 
unlike paragraph 12 of the addendum, does not clearly cover the interests of the plaintiff. It 
is not clear from the contract whether the term "prevailing party" was intended to apply only 
to the original parties to the contract, or whether it may be extended to a third-party 
beneficiary such as the plaintiff. Because the contract is ambiguous on this point the Court 
must look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties intent. There was no evidence at the 
trial on the application of the attorney's fee provision to the plaintiff. In the absence of such 
evidence the Court concludes that the plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
3. The plaintiff is entitled to be awarded all reasonable costs including those costs 
incurred in the defendant's depositions mentioned in part II of the plaintiff's memorandum. 
Dated this ! ^ day of February, 1997. 
By the Court: 
Robin W. Reese-: \ \ jp -.'•• 
District Court-'Judge - -•-. , / : / 
v . r-y^.y••'.•£.•?/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Neil R. Sabin at 1100 Eagle Gate Plaza, 60 East 
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and Vincent C. Rampton at 170 South Main 
#1500, P.O. Box 45444. Salt Lake City, Utah this | ' ^ day of February, 1977. 
lim^iMr j 
Tab 7 
Neil R. Sabin, USB No. 2840 
Annette F. Sorensen, USB No. 6989 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
WARDLEY CORPORATION, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
GRANT WELSH, ; 
Defendant. ) 
) AMENDED ORDER ON 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
) Case No. 970074 
> Civil No. 950007889CV 
• Judge Robin W. Reese 
This matter came on for trial before the above-entitled Court on December 16, 1996, the 
Honorable Robin Reese, Judge, presiding. The Plaintiff appeared by and through its counsel, 
Neil R. Sabin, and the Defendant appeared personally and by and through his counsel, Vincent 
Rampton. Pursuant to the Order of Summary Judgment in this matter, entered November 14, 
1996, the issues that were reserved for trial were: (1) Whether or not the arrangements by which 
the Plaintiff claimed a commission constituted an unlawful "net listing" and if so, whether such 
a determination would preclude a commission; and (2) issues of attorney's fees. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court ruled on the first issue relating to whether the 
arrangements constituted a "net listing," but requested the parties file additional memoranda on 
the issue of attorney's fees, and took the issue of attorneys fees under advisement. Upon 
^ %<^x 
consideration of the testimony at trial, the pleadings on file herein, as well as the memoranda 
on the issue of attorney's fees filed by both Plaintiff and Defendant, and being fully advised in 
the premises: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees in this action. 
2. The Plaintiff is awarded all reasonable costs incurred in this action, in the amount 
of $496.56, which includes those costs incurred due to the Defendant taking the depositions of 
Randy Young, Leon Peterson, Lee Stern and Lynn Wardley. 
DATED this '«r day of March, 1997. 
pjf&s&ieUi 
BY THE ( $ & f e r . : . $ ^ 
Approved as to jspbstance and form 
District*|oj#t tf$&£&T,*p j<|i 
"•••••.*.i,*'*J^.-
Nell R7Sabin 
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
Attorney for Wardley Corporation 
Vincent C. Rampton 
of JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorney for Grant Welsh 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the /4^ ' day of March, 1997, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AMENDED ORDER ON ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS by causing the same 
to mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Vincent C. Ramp ton 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main #1500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
56954 .WA770. Ill -3-
